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 This paper evaluates the United States’ decision not to come to Austria’s aid prior 
to and during the Anschluss of 12 March 1938.  The uniqueness of this work is the two-
front evaluation of both the internal/domestic affairs of the United States and the foreign 
policy of the US Government vis-à-vis Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy.  As this paper 
will show, Anschluss might have been prevented, but at a cost neither the United States 
nor European powers were willing to pay.  The domestic situation in the United States 
was too fragile, as was the lack of public support for war for FDR to have any leeway in 
militarily aiding Austria.  American, and to some degree European, opinion held that the 
Austrian question was a European matter, and to that end American domestic policy 
dominated foreign policy in hopes of reestablishing the United States economy prior to 
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Introduction 
It is the purpose of this work to try and understand why the United States did not come to 
Austria’s aid prior to its annexation by the Germans on 12 March 1938.  By examining both 
the domestic and international fronts, and the political posturing therein, the reasons supporting 
the United States’ course of action becomes clearer.  The focus, then, is on the primacy of  
domestic policies in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s thinking 
 To date there is no work, which addresses the United States’ position on the Anschluss in 
such a way.  It is my hope to prove that because of current American domestic situation 
President Roosevelt’s options were extremely limited in the realm of foreign affairs. 
 FDR’s primary concern continued to be the Great Depression and its effects on the 
country.  His main goal in the early part of his first administration had been to halt the country’s 
downward economic spiral.  Roosevelt attempted to do this through the New Deal.  It is only 
because of the heavily Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress that President 
Roosevelt’s New Deal acts could be passed so quickly, and with such little debate.     
 Another factor to be kept in mind as part of the domestic context of FDR’s foreign policy 
formulation was the isolationist and pacifist sentiment in the United States.  These groups had 
significant influence on, at first, public opinion, and later on Congressional leaders.  The work 
done by these anti-war groups caused the passage of a series of Neutrality Acts, all aimed at 
keeping the United States out of any war.   
 In the midst of both campaigning every two years and fighting to end the long economic 
depression, Franklin Roosevelt was also attempting to modify the Supreme Court.  Throughout 
the 1930s FDR continually combated the United States Supreme Court, whose justices regularly 
invalidated his New Deal acts. They left the President scrambling to alter what the court found 
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unconstitutional. Subsequently, the President passed new laws that ideologically were similar to 
the ones invalidated by the court.  FDR wanted to alter the court so that his New Deal acts would 
not continue to be invalidated due to the court’s conservative reading of the United States 
Constitution.  The main goal of the New Deal, however, was to hopefully put an end to the Great 
Depression, and ultimately bring the country back on an economic upswing.   
 In analyzing the domestic situation some events will be given further in depth treatment 
than others.  For example, the economic theories behind the Great Depression will not be 
covered in detail.  The classic works of depression economists such as John Maynard Keynes, 
Milton Friedman, and new scholarship by modern-day economists such as Ben Bernanke are 
sufficient to provide an in-depth economic picture of the United States in the 1930s.1  The New 
Deal and the early years of FDR’s presidency have also been covered extensively by many 
historians.2  This paper will go into greater detail on these domestic events, because it is very 
important to understand what legislation was being passed and invalidated, and what Roosevelt’s 
passions were in trying to prop up the U.S. economy.  It is this very passion that drove the 
President’s domestic policy, and it is the reason why the domestic policy took precedence over 
foreign affairs. 
 I also intend to show that more than enough justification can be found for the United 
States to have come to Austria’s aid prior to the Anschluss.  The correspondence between the 
U.S. ambassadors and the U.S. State Department proves that as early as 1935, and perhaps even 
earlier, many European powers correctly anticipated Germany’s aggressive moves both against 
Austria as well as other Central European nations. 
 In analyzing U.S. foreign policy through the international context, it is important to 
examine the diplomatic correspondence available, as Gerhard Weinberg notes that “American 
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diplomats in the 1930s were often extremely well informed—even if the government in 
Washington did little with their reports except file them.”  Weinberg continues, “American 
diplomats often obtained information difficult or impossible to obtain elsewhere…on such 
matters as…the developments in Austria.”3  It is also important to analyze the Anschluss by way 
of the secondary scholarship.  Works by young scholars such as Alexander Lassner and classic 
works by scholars such as Alfred Low utilize the diplomatic traffic only available in foreign 
languages, otherwise unavailable.  Through both primary and secondary sources, a clear picture 
emerges of not only the desperation of the Austrian situation, but also the diplomatic 
acknowledgement of the existence of this tragedy.  Both the archival and printed diplomatic 
records also show that there is no excuse for some combination of the Western Powers (the 
United States, Great Britain, and France) not opposing Nazi aggression and securing Austria’s 
independence. 
Domestic Policy: Depression & New Deal 
In the United States, in the post-Versailles era, most Americans experienced prosperity 
and were most concerned with tax relief and disarmament.  In 1920 when Americans went to the 
polls, they voiced their concerns and voted in Republican Warren G. Harding by an 
unprecedented majority.  Harding was an isolationist and against the Wilsonian vision of 
collective security.  He suggested instead the League of Nations a more loosely tied international 
organization that would only meet when an aggressor threatened the peace.  Harding offered 
America an alternative to internationalist Wilsonian vision.4  In America, the 1920s was a 
decade of unheralded prosperity during which small scale internationalist movements began.  No 
American, however internationalist, wanted the United States to be pulled into another war; 
although, as American diplomat George Messersmith would later point out, it would be better to 
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“fight a small war now, than a catastrophic one later.”5  Throughout the 1920s conferences were 
called, movements were started and pacts were signed, all in the name of spending less on 
defense and keeping the United States out of another war.  There was a prevailing pacifist 
sentiment in the United States. 
 The 1921 Washington Conference was called to limit the building of capital ships 
(battleships and battle cruisers) for the three largest naval powers for a period of 10 years.  The 
conference established a building ratio of 5:5:3 and applied it to the three largest naval powers 
(the United States, Great Britain, and Japan).  The major achievement of this conference for the 
United States was that the country achieved rough numerical naval equality with Great Britain 
without an increase in naval spending.  The conference also had the positive effect of ending the 
1902 naval alliance between Great Britain and Japan, as well as continuing a U.S. open-door 
policy with China.  One weakness of the conference was that auxiliary ships (cruisers, destroyers 
and submarines) were not included among the building ratios.  Unfortunately, no governing 
body, partisan or not, ever kept tabs on how many capital ships each country had built.6  
 The 1920s also saw the rise of a new breed of pacifism led by secular, rather than 
religious pacifist groups.  These new “internationalist” pacifist groups often favored the 
Wilsonian idea of collective security over isolationism or neutrality.7  In 1921 a Chicago lawyer 
named Salmon O. Levinson formed the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, whose 
sole purpose was to “have war declared illegal under international law.”8  A pacifist movement 
also swept through the United States Congress in the 1920s, causing the proposal of several anti-
war bills.  For example, in 1922 Wisconsin Congressman Edward Voight proposed an 
amendment that would have required a national referendum before Congress would have the 
authorization to declare war, an idea that gained even more support in the late 1930s.9  Likewise 
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Senator Lynn J. Frazier of North Dakota introduced an amendment to make war unconstitutional 
in every Congress from 1926 until 1937.10
 One of the key symbolic anti-war events of the 1920s was the signing of a pact between 
the United States and France, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  Signed by U.S. Secretary of 
State Frank B. Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, this Pact called for its 
signers to “renounce war as an instrument of national policy.”11  However, Secretary Kellogg 
was against committing the United States bilaterally to the agreement, so he invited all nations to 
sign this Pact.  On 27 August 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed by 14 nations, and within 
another month virtually all nations had signed it.12
Irrespective of such distinct anti-war feelings, Americans progressively became more 
internationalist during the post World War I economic boom era, also known as the “Roaring 
Twenties”.  Such feelings did not last until the end of the decade; the United States became 
fervently isolationist with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929.13   
The depression lasted more or less from 1929 until the early 1940s, without private effort 
or public intervention to fully revive the economy.14  After the October 1929 stock market crash, 
investments dropped by 87%.  But the real impact of the Great Depression was not the price of 
stocks, but rather the overall impact on the value of goods and services, unemployment, and pain 
and suffering of the American people.15
Occurring less than eight months into Herbert Hoover’s administration, the Great 
Depression’s continued and ultimately led to Hoover’s defeat in his reelection bid in1932.  
Hoover and the Republican conservatives believed that government should be non-intrusive in 
economic affairs.  Yet near the end of his term as President, Hoover favored two economic 
government intervention acts which proved to be “too little, too late” as the depression worsened 
5 
and the public grew weary of Hoover.  The peak of the depression coincidentally was 1932, an 
election year.   
The depression doomed Hoover’s chance for reelection in 1932, and definitively shaped 
his legacy.16  Certain statistics, such as the suicide rate, public and private debt, and the business 
failure rate reached their highest during the Hoover administration.  Likewise, the value of 
exports and imports reached its lowest during the Hoover administration.17
In the campaign of 1932, Hoover’s challenger, New York Governor Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, pledged a balanced budget and a 25% cut of government spending, while he accused 
the incumbent of “reckless and extravagant” spending.18  During this campaign, FDR was 
thought to be an internationalist due to his upbringing, although he largely dodged issues of 
foreign policy and ultimately focused the campaign on the domestic situation.  Favoring relief in 
the form of works projects, the candidate FDR advocated that “aid must be extended [to the 
unemployed] by the government.”19  He acknowledged that under normal circumstances relief 
for the poor was the responsibility of local government and private agencies, and “under no 
circumstances [should] any actual money be paid in the form of a dole…by the local welfare 
officer to any unemployed or his family.”  FDR also stated that this type of aid was to be 
temporary and not to be thought of as a permanent policy.20  In the 1932 Presidential election, 
most Americans seemingly wanted more change than the Republican Hoover offered them, but 
not as much offered by the Socialist candidate, Norman Thomas.  People wanted change, not a 
revolution.  Franklin Roosevelt was seemingly a good choice in 1932 because he stood for 
change, but not a change in the status quo capitalism in America.21  With 53.7% of the popular 
vote,22 carrying forty-two of forty-eight states, and 472 of 531 of the electoral votes,23 Franklin 
Roosevelt was elected president.  Roosevelt began his term in March 1933 with the Democrats 
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having gained control both the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 1932 elections.24  
The Democrats picked up ninety seats in the House, and thirteen seats in the Senate in the 1932 
election.  Seemingly, Roosevelt arrived in Washington with a mandate from the American 
people.  FDR had defeated an incumbent by one of the largest margins than by which any 
incumbent had ever been beaten, and did so campaigning to help the “forgotten man at the 
bottom of the economic pyramid.”25  Shortly after being elected, in reference to the American 
economic situation, FDR said, “it is common sense to take a method and try it.  If it fails, admit it 
frankly and try another.  But above all, try something.”  Given President Hoover’s philosophies 
on a non-government interventionist economy, and the resulting economic status of the country, 
FDR had little choice but to “try something.”  It is this type of thinking that laid the groundwork 
for FDR’s New Deal.26
Early in FDR’s administration, economist John Maynard Keynes proposed an idea to the 
President about how to end the country’s depression.  Keynes explained that during the early 
days of the depression, investments dropped significantly leaving businessmen very wary of 
investing.  Driven by their lack of faith in the economy, businessmen made the decisions to 
reduce manufacturing, which in turn produced layoffs.  Thus, layoffs caused the unemployment 
rate to increase.  Keynes postulated that in this instance if “the private sector would not spend, 
then the public sector must.”27  Keynes argued that governmental deficit spending was necessary 
specifically in this time, as raising taxes would not accomplish the desired goal of ending the 
depression.  Raising taxes would merely redistribute wealth, whereas deficit spending would put 
new dollars into people’s pockets.  FDR never directly adopted the Keynesian philosophy, and 
was never prepared to spend the amount of money that Keynes suggested; however, FDR’s New 
Deal programs were partially Keynesian on a more modest scale.28
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Although the New Deal legislation dealt with nearly every economic activity of the 
nation, it was not seen as an “economic revolution,” rather as a matter of necessity.29  Although 
FDR was primarily concerned with agriculture, and helping farmers, the New Deal also 
addressed virtually every other aspect of life, such as: banking, housing, agriculture, 
transportation, credit, insurance, etc.30  FDR claimed that his New Deal sought to bring balance 
“between agriculture and industry and balance between the wage earner, the employer and the 
consumer.”  “We seek also,” FDR said, “balance that our internal markets be kept rich and large, 
and that our trade with other nations be increased on both sides of the ledger.”31
The New Deal Acts reorganized, reformed and regulated the American economy.  
Historians, however, have long debated the motivation for the New Deal programs, both the 
administration of the funds as well as the benefits.  Traditionalists such as William Leuchtenburg 
and Arthur Schlesinger argue that the New Deal programs were administered to address the 
needs of the country, while revisionists, such as Raymond Moley and Edgar Robinson, argued 
that New Deal spending was dictated by politics.  Both views seem to be correct, at least in part.  
Politics did play a part in the distribution of New Deal monies, as some of the larger grants went 
to politically important swing states; however, states with lower employment levels did receive a 
proportionally higher number of large federal grants.32
The New Deal contained some original ideas which partly benefited the country and 
helped the economy recover, but none of the ideas actually ended the Great Depression.  
Unemployment remained at 11.3% as late as 1939 (down from its 1933 high of 20.6%, but not 
nearly the 3.2% of 1929), six years after FDR took office.33  Because of the lingering depression, 
FDR’s New Deal had its critics as well.  FDR’s critics cited the weaknesses of the New Deal as 
the absence of any steady strategy in boosting purchasing power or increasing private 
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investments.34  Roosevelt’s policies were considered to be “confusing and inconsistent” by some 
and “illogical” by others.  In hindsight, however, some modern economists, such as Milton 
Friedman, have criticized some of FDR’s New Deal acts as having lengthened the depression, 
and slowed economic growth.35
 In the early part of FDR’s first administration, economic policy and the New Deal were 
of supreme importance, but were not the only noteworthy situations in need of addressing.  
When FDR took office in March 1933, he was somewhat concerned about disarmament and the 
lack of progress made at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.36  President Roosevelt appointed 
Norman H. Davis, a confidant of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, to chair the American 
delegation at Geneva.37  In May 1933, Ambassador Norman Davis said in a speech at the 
Geneva Conference that the United States was committed to reducing its armaments, as well as 
not interfering with any League of Nations sanctions against aggressor nations.  However, 
shortly after Davis’ speech at Geneva, FDR agreed to support an amendment sponsored by 
Hiram Johnson that called for an impartial embargo.38  “The President’s failure to recognize that 
his approval of the Johnson Amendment negated Ambassador Davis’ pledge at Geneva suggests 
Roosevelt’s own overwhelming preoccupation with domestic issues at a time when crucial 
domestic legislation was nearing final approval.”39  This was a clear example that, Roosevelt 
was more concerned with his New Deal programs than with foreign affairs; however, the issue of 
impartial vs. discretionary embargos did not go away, and reappeared during the Neutrality Act 
debates in 1935. 
 The national economy made modest gains during 1933 and 1934, but by the 1934-
midterm elections, none of FDR’s New Deal programs had significantly improved the economy 
much more than Herbert Hoover’s programs had.  The unemployment rate decreased more than 
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8% in 1933 and by another 22% in 1934, and the economy was slowly showing signs of 
recovery.40  In 1933 the suicide rate decreased slightly, and the business failure rate decreased by 
35%.  In 1934 the suicide rate continued to decrease, as did the business failure rate.   
Also, in 1934 the gross national product increased for the first time since 1929, and Americans 
had more money to spend on recreation.  Increased disposable income caused attendance at 
baseball games to increase, and attendance at national monuments increased over 4000%.41   
Regardless of the slow recovery, the American people continued to have faith and 
confidence that Roosevelt and the Democrats had a better plan for recovery than the 
Republicans.  In the midterm elections the Democrats picked up an additional nine seats in the 
House and ten in the Senate, bringing the totals to ninety-nine seats gained in the House and 
twenty-three gained in the Senate since 1932.42
 Meanwhile, in Asia the Japanese had begun to show bolder movements against the 
Chinese; in Africa, Italy looked to expand its “empire” at the expense of Ethiopia.  The League 
of Nations’ inaction over these two issues caused a decline in the League’s prestige.  With a 
diminished League of Nations, and war looming on two continents now (Asia and Africa) the 
United States’ growing isolationist movement began to pursue Congressional avenues to keep 
America from entering a war.  As Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated, “An avalanche of 
isolationism was overwhelming any prospect of inducing the American people to agree to a more 
vital share in world affairs.”43  Professor Robert Dallek notes that by the mid 1930s Americans 
generally agreed that the United States’ involvement in World War I was a mistake, and that 
President Wilson’s executive freedom allowed it.  Strict limitations on the President’s power 
seemed to be the only way to prevent another war.  In hopes or preventing future wars, and in 
partial response to peace activists’ claims that the munitions industry sabotaged arms embargo 
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efforts in Congress, and the idea that arms makers pushed the country into World War I, 
Congress launched the Senate Munitions Investigating Committee to explore the arms and 
munitions industries.44
 The Munitions Committee was chaired by Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota.  Nye 
was a progressive Senator who was selected for the committee in part because of his charge that 
bankers and industrialists had pushed the U.S. into World War I.  The Nye Committee set out to 
prove that the munitions industry, “unless curbed by the government, was likely to involve the 
United States in foreign wars.”45  The committee was extremely isolationist and thought that 
peace would be best achieved by “staying home and remaining neutral.”46  In essence the 
committee’s role was two-fold, both trying to uncover the causes of American entry into the First 
World War, and to prevent its involvement in a later war. 
 The committee found that the munitions industry did partly influence the country to go to 
war, and in March 1935 President Roosevelt met with Senator Nye about the prospect of drafting 
neutrality legislation based on the findings of the committee.47  Within three weeks of FDR’s 
meeting with the Nye Committee, two House Resolutions and two Senate Resolutions (one 
sponsored by Senator Nye) were introduced into Congress.  However well-intentioned this 
committee was, the overall effect of the Nye Committee’s findings was to “throw the country 
into the deepest isolationism at the very moment when [U.S.] influence was so vitally needed to 
help ward off the approaching threats of war abroad.”48  This stance proved to be detrimental to 
the survival of the Austrian state.49
Due to the escalating situation between the Italians and the Ethiopians, Congressional 
leaders desired to pass legislation before the end of the 1935 session.  For this same reason 
Secretary Hull was trying to delay the Nye Committee hearings, delay neutrality legislation, and 
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delay the State Department giving an “official position” on neutrality.50  While Congress was 
debating several versions of neutrality legislation, President Roosevelt’s New Deal was dealt a 
severe blow when on “Black Monday,” the Supreme Court ruled three of the New Deal acts as 
unconstitutional.  This was an unexpected move by the Court because judicial nullification was a 
seldom-used practice in U.S. history.51   
By late August, a neutrality bill sponsored by Key Pittman (D-NV), Chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, passed the Senate.  A unified State Department voice of Secretary 
Hull and Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore tried to lobby the president to kill the Pittman bill, 
which called for an impartial embargo.52  FDR refused to veto the bill in fear of disrupting the 
ten pieces of pending domestic policy legislation [again showing FDR’s deference to domestic 
politics], some of which were in direct response to the court’s “Black Monday” invalidations.  
Roosevelt agreed to the impartial embargo if the act expired in six months and if the President 
was given leeway in defining the “arms, ammunition and other implements of war” that the 
legislation indicated were to be embargoed.  Soon after, the amended bill passed the House and 
the following day passed the Senate.53
The Neutrality Act based on the Nye committee’s findings was passed in August 1935.  
The largest debate over the proposed neutrality legislation was whether the proposed embargo 
should apply to all parties equally (an impartial embargo) or a discretionary embargo in which 
the President would be able to choose to which nation or nations to apply the embargo.  Pacifists 
and Congressional leaders mostly supported an impartial embargo, although some thought an 
impartial embargo did not go far enough.  As Senator Nye put it, “my own belief is that a 
complete embargo on all trade is the only absolute insurance against the United States being 
drawn into another prolonged major war between great powers.”54  The President favored 
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collective security,55 but was willing to acquiesce to a discretionary embargo so long as the 
debate was not long and drawn out.56  Roosevelt feared that a lengthy debate over neutrality 
would interfere with the passage of his domestic programs, such as the Guffey Coal Act, which 
was being debated concurrently.57  The State Department was split over the embargo question: 
Secretary Cordell Hull and Undersecretary William Phillips favored a discretionary embargo, 
while Assistant Secretary Moore and Chief of Western European Affairs J. Pierrepont Moffat 
favored an impartial embargo.58  Secretary Hull actually opposed all neutrality legislation 
because of the threat of war around the world, but like FDR, he was willing to acquiesce to the 
more palatable discretionary embargo.59  Public sentiment in the form of pacifists and church 
groups favored collective security, and only half-heartedly supported any form of neutrality 
legislation.60  Many who originally favored the Wilsonian ideal of collective security abandoned 
it in favor of neutrality due to the global situation and collective security’s growing unpopularity 
with the American public.61
The Neutrality Act of 1935 created a National Munitions Control Board headed by the 
Secretary of State to “license and supervise all arms shipments [and prohibit] the carrying of 
munitions in American ships either to belligerents or to neutrals for transshipment to 
belligerents.”  The act also stated that American citizens who traveled on belligerent ships did so 
at their own risk.  Congress adjourned on 26 August, and on 31 August 1935, FDR signed the 
bill which was set to expire on 29 February 1936.  Upon signing the act, Roosevelt issued a 
statement indicating that the arms embargo might have the opposite effect and could possibly 
drag the United States into a war.  “History is filled with unforeseeable situations that call for 
some flexibility of action.”62  Roosevelt agreed to sign the Neutrality Act both because he was 
hoping to gain concessions when it expired in six months, and because he was fearful of 
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jeopardizing the passage of his New Deal programs.63  The Neutrality Act passed on 31 August 
was the first departure from traditional American neutrality.  In the meantime, the Neutrality Act 
(the nation’s new standard of neutrality) was quickly put to the test.64
The world was abhorred to read in October 1935 about the fighting breaking out in 
Ethiopia (also known as Abyssinia).  The Ethiopians, infamously called by Emperor Haile 
Selassie to bring their spears, were no match for the Italians and their modern weapons.  Because 
of the mismatch, Secretary of State Cordell Hull considered declaring neutrality to be 
unnecessary, as the application would have been as blatantly anti-Italian.  President Roosevelt, 
on the other hand, thought it was important to warn Americans that a list would be published of 
all American citizens traveling on belligerent ships to Italy or Ethiopia, as well as anyone who 
exported essential raw materials (oil, steel, etc.) to either belligerent.  FDR was later convinced 
by his advisors that publishing such lists would be an unwise decision, so the President opted not 
to follow through with his idea.65  Shortly thereafter, on 5 October, Secretary Hull issued his 
“moral embargo” which encouraged people not to trade the essential raw materials that make war 
possible to either belligerent.66  Trade of essential raw materials was not specifically addressed 
by the Neutrality Act, so the government had no legal recourse, and could only suggest that 
American businessmen not involve themselves in trading these “contraband” goods.67
President Roosevelt ironically declared that he did not “believe that the American People 
[would] wish for abnormally increased profits that temporarily might be secured by greatly 
extending our trade in such materials; nor [would] they wish the struggles on the battlefield to be 
prolonged because of profits…”  FDR was proven wrong because despite these statements, 
American trade with Italy in these essential raw materials dramatically increased in October 
1935.  Keep in mind that at this point in history the United States produced more than fifty 
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percent of the world’s oil, and that oil was the most essential commodity shipped to Italy and its 
war machine.  Italy would have had great difficulty in replacing the oil supplied by the United 
States.  But much to President Roosevelt’s chagrin, the October 1935 oil exports to Italy were 
shown to be twice as high as the normal level for October.68
FDR could not deny that American oil was fueling Mussolini’s war machine; yet, despite 
governmental warnings there had been significant increases in the export of oil, copper, scrap 
iron and steel, as well as other materials.69  In November 1935, the oil exports to Italy reached 
three times their normal level.  Hull’s “moral embargo” was an abysmal failure, seemingly 
proving correct Senator Nye’s hypothesis that American businessmen favored profit over 
peace.70  The Ethiopian crisis served as a lesson to American policymakers that “arms and 
munitions” were not the only things that drive a war, and that essential raw materials should have 
been evaluated in any posture of keeping the United States out of a war.71  With the 1935 
Neutrality Act, set to expire on 29 February, 1936, the next Congress began with debates about a 
new Neutrality Act. 
Although the Ethiopian Crisis showed just how important the trade of raw materials was, 
in late February 1936, when the Neutrality Act was set to expire, Congress decided after much 
debate to extend the existing act with only minor changes.  FDR had agreed back in August 1935 
to the Neutrality Act in its original form, in hopes of gaining concessions with the act.  With the 
passage of the new Neutrality Act, FDR did not receive any of the concessions he first sought in 
August 1935.72
The changes integrated in the new legislation included that the President was obligated to 
apply an embargo impartially to nations currently warring at the time of the passage of the 
legislation, specifically worded to address the situations in Asia and Africa.  Also added was a 
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prohibition on loans to belligerents.73  It was a disappointing setback for the President that his 
provision to limit the trade of essential raw materials to belligerents was not included in the new 
Neutrality extension.74  The President was willing to accept the 1936 Neutrality Act “as is” due 
to the upcoming election.  He did not want neutrality to be an “anti-administration” issue, in the 
upcoming election.  The new act was set to expire 1 May 1937.75
Shortly after the U.S. Congress renewed the Neutrality Act, in March 1936 the prestige of 
the League of Nations further declined when Nazi Germany unilaterally remilitarized the 
Rhineland.76  This was Germany’s first move toward recapturing the territory lost by the Treaty 
of Versailles.  Although, Hull continued to press that “peace and strict neutrality… [were] the 
cornerstone of American foreign policy,” historian Irwin Gellman notes that by this point 
President Roosevelt saw war in Europe as inevitable.77
However, in the United States, Franklin Roosevelt’s attention was not on the Rhineland 
or war, it was on reelection.  The President continued to be preoccupied by his reelection bid in 
November 1936, and focused his campaign on the merits of his New Deal.78
Also, in mid-1936 Sumner Welles became the new Under Secretary of State, replacing 
William Phillips (who became the new U.S. Ambassador to Italy).  Welles subsequently 
reorganized the State Department, due to a cut in the department’s budget, which resulted in the 
elimination of 40-50 positions.  This reorganization coincided with President Roosevelt recalling 
several Ambassadors to European nations to aid in the President’s 1936 reelection bid.  The State 
Department prior to the mid-1936 cuts was barely able to process the foreign correspondence, 
and after the cuts the department suffered even more.79
Shortly after President Roosevelt’s landslide reelection, the Supreme Court, for a change, 
gave a favorable ruling to the President.  In U.S. v Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland, speaking 
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for the Court, ruled that the President has superior power, above all others, in the case of foreign 
affairs.  The President, the court said, had better chance of knowing the actual conditions in 
foreign countries, and he is often privy to information that others are not.  Foreign affairs are 
often based upon this secret knowledge, the release of which may be detrimental to the situation.  
The court went on to say that in foreign affairs, legislation “must often accord to the President a 
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were 
domestic affairs alone involved.”80  This ruling strengthened the President’s position from which 
he tried to direct foreign policy.  Coming off a massive victory and on the heels of the Supreme 
Court’s favorable ruling, in late December 1936 Roosevelt asked Congress for permanent 
neutrality legislation.  Unfortunately, the President’s request would be delayed due to the civil 
war in Spain.81
 Since the 1936 Neutrality Act did not specifically cover civil wars, Secretary of State 
Hull issued another “moral embargo.”  However, in late December several individuals applied 
for permission to export airplanes to the Spanish Government (over the moral embargo).  
Roosevelt denounced this request as “legal but unpatriotic,” as the U.S. government could legally 
take no action since exportation was lawful.  Naturally, this action stirred the government to 
begin considering legislation to address nations involved in a civil war.  Ironically, much of the 
aid sent to the Republican Government of Spain in violation of the moral embargo ended up in 
the hands of Franco’s rebel forces.82  Professor and historian Robert Divine has noted that this 
episode caused FDR to realize that had he “possessed broad discretionary powers he could have 
dealt with the problem swiftly and efficiently,” and this began to change his mind with regard to 
neutrality.  He knew, however, that his will was not necessarily the will of the people due to a 
January 1937 poll revealing that 69% of Americans favored Congress being responsible for the 
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American Neutrality policy, and not the president.83  Regardless of who dictated the neutrality 
policy, the fact remained that the Spanish Civil War had revealed the shortcomings of the 1936 
Neutrality Act, which made no provisions for civil wars.  Rebel leader Francisco Franco 
reportedly praised Roosevelt for the U.S. foreign policy stating that it was a gesture that the 
rebels would never forget.84
 In early 1937, while debating a new Neutrality Act, Senator Nye, among others, felt that 
the United States’ position of neutrality towards Spain should be reexamined due to Germany 
and Italy’s quasi open-ended aid of Franco’s revolutionaries.  Neutrality in this case actually was 
helping the rebels.  To make matters worse, news of conflicts pouring in from around the world 
was so dreadful that both democrats and republicans were “beginning to look like bad 
watchmen.”85  Some, like Nye, wanted to extend the embargo to Germany and Italy, whereas 
some favored lifting the embargo as to make materiel available to the Spanish government.86  
Probably the chief reason, however, why the United States was adamantly against aiding either 
side in the Spanish conflict was the both non-interventionist stance of other European nations 
such as Britain and France.  Without addressing many of the concerns raised by Senator Nye and 
others, on 1 May 1937, the day that the 1936 Neutrality Act expired, FDR signed a new 
permanent Neutrality Act into law.87  Because he was left with little discretionary power, FDR 
announced in June, after the passage of the 1937 Neutrality Act that no change would be made in 
the policy towards Spain.88
The 1937 permanent Neutrality Act provided that whenever the president found to exist a 
state of war between two nations or whenever a civil war existed which “endangered the peace” 
of the United States, four major restrictions automatically took place:  
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1. An embargo of arms, ammunition and implements of war (not including essential raw 
materials) to all belligerents; 
2. A ban on loans to belligerents; 
3. A ban on arming merchant ships dealing with belligerents ; 
4. A ban on American citizens traveling on belligerent ships. 
The new Neutrality Act included a “cash-and-carry” portion that limited trade of goods to normal 
pre-war levels” and that had a 2-year trial period after which the president could decide if it was 
necessary.89  Because of its cash-and-carry measure, the 1937 Neutrality Act favored both 
aggressors such as Japan and sea powers such as Britain as both had the means to transport 
goods from America.90  This permanent attempt at neutrality legislation shows how difficult it 
was to anticipate future world affairs.  Each time a neutrality act was passed, a belligerent 
inadvertently circumvented it, throwing the President and the Congress into a frenzy to try and 
reconcile the legislation to current events.   
 In July-August 1937, Japan attacked China west of Peking, starting an informal 
undeclared war, which prompted FDR not to apply the Neutrality Act.91  It was determined by 
the administration that the application of the Neutrality Act would greatly favor Japan who had a 
Navy superior to the Chinese, and could take advantage of the cash-and-carry portion of the act.  
Since Japan was decidedly the aggressor, and the United States had good relations with China, 
President Roosevelt did not want to appear to be aiding one side over the other.92
 However, just as the U.S. economy was gaining momentum, all attention in the Roosevelt 
Administration folded inward in late August 1937 when the economy hit a slump.  Government 
spending seemed to be the only thing keeping the economy going and in 1937 when Roosevelt 
tried to cut spending, the economy suffered for it and FDR had become a “prisoner of his own 
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spending policies.”93  From August 1937 to May 1938 unemployment increased from 4,991,000 
to 9,587,000.  This economic downturn was nicknamed the “Roosevelt Recession.”94
 The recession of 1937-1938 was caused by a reduction of government spending, and was 
counteracted by using Keynesian government spending policies.95   In regards to the new 
recession the New York Times in autumn 1937 said that, “the cause is attributed by some to 
taxation… [and] by others to the demoralization of production caused by strikes.”96  Journalist 
and author Amity Shlaes adds that, “both the taxes and the strikes were the result of Roosevelt 
policy.”97  In 1939, the government tripled the deficit of 1938, which ended the recession but 
only brought things back to “depression normal” and did not return the country to prosperity.  
The FDR administration never spent the amount of money suggested by Keynes to pull the 
country out of depression (5 to 10 times more was needed to be according to Keynes).98  The 
recession had such a profound effect on the country that when the Japanese attacked the U.S.S. 
Panay in late 1937, killing two Americans and wounding fifty others, the outcry for war was nil.  
Even at this event, some Americans pushed even harder for isolationism.99
While the U.S. economy was backsliding, many still seemed to be unhappy with the 1937 
permanent Neutrality Act.  So many were dissatisfied that between the winter 1937 and spring 
1938, more than 20 bills challenging the Neutrality Act were put forth in Congress.  It was 
obvious to both internationalists and isolationists that the situation that existed was favorable to 
neither camp.100  In early 1938, even Senator Nye proposed legislation that favored either a cash-
and-carry benefit for the Spanish loyalists, or lifting of the embargo for the Loyalists only and 
keeping the embargo on the rebels.101
From mid-1937 on, Franklin Roosevelt was reluctant to risk anything in the realm of 
foreign affairs.  Hugo Black, FDR’s nominee for the Supreme Court, was found to be a former 
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member of the Ku Klux Klan (a white supremacist group); moreover, the “Roosevelt Recession”, 
and the so called, “court-packing” crusade had made Roosevelt the most unpopular of his long 
presidency.  With so much controversy in domestic affairs, now was not the time for 
controversial moves in foreign affairs.102
  Such is a brief overview of the complex domestic situation in the United States in the 
1930s.  President Roosevelt had his hands full simply with internal affairs and American politics.  
But the global picture was significantly more complex and more convoluted than that of U.S. 
domestic policy.  With rising conflicts in Europe, Africa and Asia worldwide peace was being 
threatened, and sooner or later the United States would be forced into action. 
Foreign Policy: Austria & Anschluss 
In the pre-World War II context, why was Austria so important and why should her 
independence have mattered to the United States?  Austria was important because it was the first 
sovereign, independent nation that was overpowered by the Third Reich.   In the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or National Socialist German Workers Party 
(hereinafter referred to as “Nazi”) era, Austria desired independence and autonomous freedom, 
but did not have the ability to achieve it alone.  Austria’s independence had to be guaranteed by 
nations more powerful than the stripped and broken Österreich.  Unfortunately, Austria could 
never find an agreement that ensured its independence.  The importance of Austrian 
independence was crucial on the eve of a possible new war.  Had the western powers been 
agreeable to stop Hitler in 1938, World War II might have been averted.  That may be 
speculative, but the evidence that follows paints a picture that the Anschluss did not come as a 
surprise; the Western powers did not need to sacrifice Austria and appease Hitler.  The argument 
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by some that Austria was “historically German” and ought to be included in the Deutsches Reich  
(German Empire), lacks validity in light of the two countries’ distinctly separate histories. 
When evaluating Austro-German relations, one must consider their history.  From 1848 
forward, many Austro-Germans thought of themselves as members of the German Nation (an 
ethnic group characterized by a common language, geography, determination, beliefs and 
character).103  The First World War fortified the links between the Austrians and the Germans.104  
Yet, despite similar identities and common language, the cultural differences between the 
Austrians and Germans were “substantial, and reasserted themselves quite independently of 
Allied promptings in 1919,” as the two countries had already drifted apart prior to the end of 
World War I.  In fact Austria had not been part of Imperial Germany, and therefore Germany did 
not “lose” Austria at Versailles.105
 After World War I, the victors drafted in Paris, a treaty of terms and boundaries for 
Germany and Austria.  The resultant Treaty of Versailles carved up Central Europe, and created 
new artificial borders for Germany based on European security needs rather than nationalist 
promptings.  As a result, Germany was reduced in size and stripped of her colonies.  Austrian 
Chancellor Karl Renner, in going to St. Germain, told his people that he would get the best terms 
possible for Austria.106  Yet, there was little Renner could do as Austria was formally stripped of 
most of the territories she had gained since the fourteenth century.107  Included in these 
territories was the Austrian South Tyrol.  Although the majority of residents in the South Tyrol 
spoke German, the Italians annexed it with little difficulty, establishing a new Italian-Austrian 
border at the Brenner Pass.108  The peacemakers in Paris arbitrarily created a host of smaller 
states out of the former central Europeans monarchies, and as Georges Clemenceau, French 
Prime Minister (1917-1920) dramatically put it, “Austria, that is what is left over.”109
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Postwar Austria was in a desperate situation, as economic conditions were extremely 
poor.  Austria was, “a land without coal, one that was unable to produce sufficient foodstuffs” 
within its own borders.  To make matters worse, Austria had no major export industries, and 
would have a difficult time at best existing independently.110   
 Following World War I, Austria had no separate national identity other than a 
Germanocentric view of the world.  Many Austrians in all political camps viewed Anschluss as 
the only solution to their many problems.  Trying to evoke point number ten of President 
Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”, the principle of self-determination, Austria moved 
towards Anschluss, but was denied by the European powers.111  In post-Versailles Austria, the 
socialists were the first group to push for Anschluss.  During the St. Germain talks Austrians 
insisted on Anschluss; Germans felt that the terms of the peace treaty would be tougher on them 
if they were pushing towards a union with Austria.112
 Due to overwhelming public opinion Germany and Austria signed an agreement that 
called for a speedy unification.  Austria would essentially be relegated to being a former 
province, with Vienna becoming a “second German capital.”  At least such an Anschluss 
agreement would allow Austria to exist in a state other than destitute poverty.113
 Anschluss, however, was never a viable option as far as the four victorious powers 
(United States, Britain, France and Italy) were concerned.  Germany’s interpretation of Wilson’s 
fourteen points argued that this violated the principle of self-determination, but the four powers 
disagreed.  The World War I victors correctly thought that Anschluss would lead to Germany’s 
economic and political domination of Central Europe, the very preponderance that the victorious 
powers were trying to prevent.  Allowing Germany to annex Austria would place Germany on 
the Brenner Pass, which the Italians strongly opposed, and Czechoslovakia feared being 
23 
surrounded on three sides by Germany.  Nor did any of the Balkan states wish to have Germany 
on the Danube River, in a position to dominate Southeast Europe.114  France was the staunchest 
opponent of Anschluss as, “no French politician was prepared to permit vanquished Germany to 
expand its territory and add some 6.5 million people to its population.”  Especially considering 
that Anschluss would have strengthened Germany beyond the power she had in 1914 (given that 
Austria was more ethnically homogeneous and geographically more important than the outlying 
parts of what was Imperial Germany).115
In the early 1930s, while the United States was shifting to the left from the Republican 
Hoover to the Democratic Roosevelt, Europe was shifting even more radically to the right.  In 
May 1932 Engelbert Dollfuss became Chancellor in Austria, and in January 1933 Adolf Hitler 
became Chancellor in Germany.  Shortly after Hitler’s Machtergreifung (seizure of power) or as 
some have said Machterschleichung (sneaking into power), the Nazis won a plurality of the seats 
in the Reichstag, the German Parliament.  With the rise of Dollfuss in Austria and Hitler and the 
Nazis in Germany, the mood in Austria shifted towards nationalism and away from Anschluss.116   
But the new Nazi German government favored Anschluss, more so than ever.  Shortly 
after the rise of the Nazis in Germany, homegrown Nazi terrorism began in Austria.  Chancellor 
Dollfuss reacted to these Nazi actions by banning all activities by the Nazi Party in Austria.  
This, naturally, prompted even more terrorism by the Austrian Nazis.  Dollfuss complained to 
Britain, France, and Italy after having warned Germany to stop their support of subversive Nazi 
actions and terrorism.  Hitler's response to Dollfuss' complaint was that it was not a matter of 
subversion, but rather of one German people.  Hitler argued that the oneness of German people 
could not be expected to subscribe to political lines, and that the actions of Austrian Nazis were 
24 
due to the movement of Greater German people, not deliberate activities on behalf of one 
country trying to overthrow another.117   
In retaliation, Dollfuss then revamped the state closer to an authoritarian/fascist model.  
In exchange for agreeing to implement fascist policies Dollfuss received a promise of military 
assistance from Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini, if the Nazis tried to force Anschluss.  Dollfuss 
then dissolved the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party, or SPÖ), 
independent unions, and workers’ associations and seized all of their possessions.  At this point 
nearly two-thirds of the Austrian population was denied any voice in the Dollfuss government.  
German Chancellor and Nazi leader Adolf Hitler was extremely displeased with Dollfuss’ anti-
German actions, and shortly thereafter the Austrian Nazis attempted a coup d’ètat.118  
The Nazis rocked the Austrian government on July 25, 1934 with the murder of 
Chancellor Dollfuss during a failed putsch attempt.119  In support of Austria, Italian leader 
Benito Mussolini, also known as “Il Duce”, sent four army divisions to the Austrian border to 
show his support for his fallen comrade Chancellor Dollfuss, and for Austrian independence.120  
Upon Dollfuss’ murder Kurt Schuschnigg, Dollfuss’ Minister of Justice, became Chancellor of 
Austria.  From his earliest days in office, Schuschnigg was clear in stating that maintaining 
Austrian independence was of paramount importance.121
Schuschnigg hoped that Austrian independence could be maintained by creating of an 
“Austrian pact,” that would be guaranteed by Britain, France, and Italy.122  Without Italy’s 
support, Schuschnigg acknowledged that Austrian independence would be difficult to maintain.  
This proved to be especially clear in 1935/36 when Mussolini embarked on colonial conquest in 
Africa. 
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In violation of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany revealed the existence of an air force 
and plans to build a 550,000 man army.  In response to this, FDR drafted a peace plan that called 
for England, France, Italy, Poland, Belgium, Holland and possibly Russia to agree to blockade 
Germany (thereby controlling all of Germany’s imports and exports).  FDR would shortly 
thereafter re-suggest this idea of a blockade to the participants at the Stresa Conference.123
In mid-1935, just a few months after Germany’s violation of the Treaty of Versailles, 
Mussolini and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval met in Rome to discuss several issues of 
geopolitical importance to both Italy and France, one of which was the preservation of Austrian 
independence.  French Prime Minister Pierre Laval and Mussolini agreed in the “Rome Accords” 
to consult if Austrian independence was threatened.  The Austrian Chancellor was not satisfied 
with this agreement because it did not include a provision for guaranteed military aid to Austria, 
something Kurt Schuschnigg saw as vital to Austrian security.124  Although the British approved 
of the “Rome Accords,” after Laval agreed to grant Mussolini a “free hand” in Ethiopia, the 
British withdrew their support.  Shortly thereafter, upon hearing a rumor of an impending 
German-Austrian alliance, Britain, France and Italy met at Stresa, Italy, to attempt to work out an 
agreement to preserve Austrian independence.  In the United States, President Roosevelt had 
high hopes for the Stresa meeting.  The President hoped that the three parties would agree and 
partner with the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) so that a blockade of 
Germany could be established that the United States could “officially recognize.”  However, at 
the Stresa Conference (also known as the “Stresa Front”) Britain refused to agree to defend 
Austria under any circumstances.  Britain’s refusal to defend Austria was caused in large part 
due to Britain’s ongoing quarrel with Italy over the Duce’s colonial aspirations in Africa.125
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In October 1935 shortly after the formation of the Stresa Front, Il Duce, suffering from a 
bad case of imperial fever, invaded Ethiopia.  Britain was very concerned over this aggression, 
but not so much out of concern for the Ethiopian people rather because of Ethiopia’s strategical 
importance.126  Even before Ethiopia was defeated, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini seeing 
himself as a modern-day Caesar, publicly expressed interest in expanding his empire north of 
Ethiopia.  The Duce, after his conquest of Ethiopia, had his sights set on the British controlled 
countries Sudan and Egypt.  He wanted his Italian empire to stretch from the Mediterranean Sea 
to the Indian Ocean.127  An Italian presence in Ethiopia was “too close for both British comfort”, 
as London was worried about the security of its African colonies that bordered Ethiopia.128  
However, Britain knew that it could not afford to directly challenge Italy’s presence in Africa, as 
it might push Italy closer to an alliance with Germany, which neither Britain nor France nor 
Austria wanted.129
Meanwhile in Central Europe Nazi Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, in violation of 
the Versailles and Locarno Treaties.  Although many were worried, including the Austrian 
government which clearly understood this event to have lasting significance for Mitteleuropa, 
none of the world powers reacted to Germany’s move into the Rhineland because it was formerly 
and historically part of Greater Germany.  The neutralized Rhineland was a unique creation of 
Versailles, created within Germany, whereas Austria and Czechoslovakia were created as 
independent.  Because of the Rhineland’s history and political status, many expected German to 
someday again reoccupy the Rhineland.  However, after Germany abruptly remilitarized the 
Rhineland world leaders pondered Germany’s next move.130  Some felt Czechoslovakia would 
be next on Hitler’s list of countries; others felt that Austria would be next.  William Bullitt, 
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Ambassador to France (1936-1940) said that France would not fight for Czechoslovakia if they 
had to fight Germany unilaterally.131   
After the Rhineland incident, in early 1936, Mussolini and Austrian Chancellor Kurt 
Schuschnigg had a meeting in which Mussolini recommended to Schuschnigg that Austria 
improve their relations with Germany because due to the strain on Italian resources as a result of 
Mussolini’s Ethiopian adventure, they could no longer guarantee Austrian independence.  Il 
Duce suggested that Austria look to Germany to ensure their independence.132  With the July 11, 
1936 agreement with Nazi Germany, Kurt Schuschnigg tried to do just that. 
 The “July Agreement” as it has become known, was the first major event on the road to 
Anschluss.  In this agreement between Schuschnigg and Hitler, Austria agreed to give the 
Austrian Nazis amnesty, to give the Austrian “national” opposition (the Nazis) cabinet 
representation, and align the Austrian government closely with German foreign policy.  In return 
for all of these Austrian concessions, Germany agreed to recognize Austrian independence 
(something that Adolf Hitler had refused to do up to this point).  Austria saw this agreement as a 
fixed basis of future policy between Austria and Germany.  Germany saw this same agreement as 
another step on the road to Anschluss.133
 George Messersmith, the U.S. ambassador to Austria (1934-1937), on the day of the 
agreement between Austria and Germany, wrote a letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 
which Messersmith questioned Germany’s motives.  Why, Messersmith postulated, would 
Germany now recognize Austrian independence, when they had refused to do so prior to this?  
He had no answer other than to speculate that it could be due to improving British-German 
relations.  Messersmith thought that in the long run the agreement would enslave Austria to 
Germany.134   
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 Earlier in 1936 Messersmith promoted the position that Germany’s natural economic 
hinterland was Südosteuropa (Southeast Europe).  This was a principal reason, he said, that it 
made sense that Germany protested against any trade agreement among Southeastern European 
countries.  Germany wanted bilateral agreements with each of these countries individually.  
Germany’s deliberate plan, which was in the making, involved running up large debts in 
Southeast Europe and then paying them back with goods and not hard currency.  This essentially 
led these countries to becoming more economically dependent on Germany.  Economic 
dependence, in George Messersmith’s view, led to political dependence.  Messersmith said that 
German trade agreements were designed to help Germany and hurt everyone else.  Only with a 
favorable balance of trade could Germany continue to rearm.  Without such a balance the Nazis 
had no money for rearmament.135
 Soon after the July 11 Agreement, Schuschnigg speculated, “those who could still help 
no longer deemed Austria worth saving.”  Austria was a reminder to the West of postwar 
mistakes in diplomacy.  Some U.S. conservatives, ignorant of Pan-German history, argued that 
Austria and Germany were historically and racially destined to become one state.  After the July 
11 Agreement, many of Austria’s supporters gave up hope.  Messersmith predicted that the July 
11 agreement had more to do with Italy and Germany than Austria and Germany.  Messersmith 
also said that Italy was still playing the field and was not committed to Germany just yet; some 
would say that Messersmith was wrong on both accounts.  In any event, European security was 
maintained so long as Italy remained aligned with Britain and France.136
Just as Europe was beginning to settle after the July 11 agreement, Civil War broke out in 
Spain on July 17, 1936 (an event that made President Roosevelt even more skeptical of trying to 
maintain European peace).137  The United States was not really interested in the internal affairs 
29 
of Spain or saving Spanish democracy; the real danger of the Spanish Civil War was its spillover 
effect and the threat of a general European war.  War in Spain ultimately pitted the National 
government, and its supporters Russia, England and France against a group of rebels led by 
General Francisco Franco and his allies Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.  Although it was 
unknown at the time, the Spanish Civil War offered a glimpse of the future alliances that would 
develop during World War II.138
Since Germany and Italy were fighting on the same side, aiding Franco’s rebels, the 
Western nations desiring peace (i.e. United States, Britain, and France) were careful not to act in 
tandem and cement an alliance between Hitler and Mussolini, which might have led to 
Anschluss.  No one, except Germany, wanted Anschluss; so the United States, Britain and France 
took the neutral road. Little did anyone know that Hitler was purposely withholding aid from 
Franco in hopes of lengthening the Spanish conflict, and draw Italy closer to Germany and 
further from the Western powers.139
Italy also added to the push towards Anschluss, when in May 1936 Mussolini dismissed 
his pro-Austrian Foreign Minister, Fulvio Suvich in favor of his son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano, who 
was notoriously pro-German.140  In October of the same year, Ciano visited Berlin where he 
made agreements with the Germans that essentially abandoned Italian protection of the 
Schuschnigg government and Austrian independence.  Later, Ciano reaffirmed what Il Duce had 
told Schuschnigg a few months earlier that Italy could no longer give them any material support 
because of the resources needed to be sent to Spain; Ciano suggested that Austria turn to 
Germany for further help.141  Amazingly, in spite of Ciano’s actions, neither Schuschnigg nor the 
other Austrian leaders counted Italy out of an “Austrian Pact” as many still saw Mussolini 
through the “rose colored glasses of July 25, 1934.”142  Within weeks, on November 1, 
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Mussolini publicized an Italian-German agreement, the groundwork of which was laid during 
Ciano’s October visit to Berlin.  This agreement became known as the “Pact of Steel” or the 
“Rome-Berlin Axis.”143
The Rome-Berlin Axis was a settlement between Italy and Germany in which they agreed 
to pursue joint diplomatic and economic policies in the Danubian region.  This meant Italy’s 
final abandonment of Austria.  Both Italy and Germany agreed to openly aid Francisco Franco 
and the rebels (Spanish Nationalists) in Spain.  Additionally, the German government officially 
recognized Mussolini’s conquest of Ethiopia.  Global tensions were mounting in response to the 
solidification of a formal alliance between Italy and Germany, and the seemingly impending 
Anschluss.144
In response to growing global tensions, President Roosevelt gave a speech on August 14, 
1936 in Chautauqua, New York that quickly became known as the “I hate war” speech.  FDR 
stated that he hated war, and although the United States did not want war, the United States also 
did not want to let war occur due to American passivity.  The speech was important in that the 
FDR wanted to show that the United States was not afraid of going to war if war was necessary.  
It is doubtful that at this time President Roosevelt could have actually intervened because of both 
the strong isolationist sentiment and close proximity to the November presidential election in the 
United States, not to mention that at this point the U.S. military was not prepared for such action. 
After FDR’s Chautauqua speech, warnings such as that of Emil Ludwig began to filtrate 
into the State Department.  Ludwig, a noted Jewish philosopher and rabbi espoused in a letter to 
Cordell Hull a common view of the anticipated German plan for European domination.  In his 
letter Ludwig said that Germany would not settle for anything less than defeat of the West, and 
that it was a mistake to believe that Germany would be satisfied by having colonies without 
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having a war.  “They don’t want land,” claimed Ludwig, “but the satisfaction of being victorious 
over France.”145  Ludwig added that the United States was the only country that Germany feared.  
This fear was rooted in their defeat at the hands of the Americans in 1918.  He made it clear that 
“[isolationism] is the very thing the Germans [are] praying for.”146
William Dodd, U.S. Ambassador to Germany (1933-1938), said in August 1936 that 
Germany was resuming her normal position of importance in Europe, logically followed by the 
collapse of the artificial Europe created by the Treaty of Versailles; Messersmith chimed in that 
it was Germany’s goal to be the strongest nation on Earth.147  As time progressed and it looked 
more certain that Britain and France would do nothing to stop German posturing, Dodd indicated 
there was a good chance that the Nazis were going to be able to dominate Europe without 
fighting a war.148
Shortly after FDR’s “I hate war” speech, and Dodd’s comments on the “rebirth” of 
Germany, Hitler drafted what would become known as the “Four-Year Plan.”  “Its significance 
derives from the fact that Hitler hardly ever put pen to paper throughout his entire dictatorship, 
but on this occasion the substance of his thoughts was sufficiently important to the future 
development of Germany policy for him to set them down himself.”149  In this plan, Hitler called 
for a program of substantial militarization and the “unrestricted mobilization of the nation’s 
economic resources to prepare for [an] apocalyptic struggle.”150  This plan became the basis of 
subsequent German military, economic, and foreign policy.151
At the end of 1936, a tumultuous year in world politics, Commander-in Chief of the 
Deutsche Luftwaffe (German Air Force), Hermann Göring after a secret meeting on the Four-
Year Plan, arrogantly told U.S. Ambassador to Germany William Dodd that the duty of the 
German economic machine was to serve the interests of the whole German community, which 
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compelled universal obedience.  He went on to say that Germany planned to rearm to the fullest 
extent possible.  Göring claimed that military self-sufficiency was paramount and he called 
industry, workers, and the people to be “prepared for further sacrifice.” He also claimed that the 
day would come for Austrians when they would consider it an honor to be given the Hitler 
salute.152  Comments such as these leave little to the imagination about the Nazis’ firm intentions 
vis-à-vis Austria.  But even at this point at the end of 1936 it was not too late to save Austria; 
Germany still lacked the financial resources to militarily pursue Anschluss.   
However, with President Roosevelt fresh off his big reelection victory, and confident in 
his Supreme Court reorganization plan, the United States commander-in-chief was still resoundly 
focused on domestic politics rather than war looming in Europe.  To compound this, U.S. 
Ambassador to Austria George Messersmith thought that his long awaited economic crisis had 
finally hit Germany, and that the Nazis would not last throughout the year, as Germany was 
running out of raw materials, and fast.153  At the beginning of 1937 the FDR apparently had an 
abundance of reasons to focus on the domestic agenda, and fewer reasons to concern himself 
with Europe’s affairs. 
 Early in 1937 Mussolini formally abandoned the Stresa Front and later that year joined 
the Anti-Comintern Pact.  Some saw this as Italy’s formal abandonment of their support for an 
independent Austria (although Italy’s informal abandonment of Austria began prior to July 11, 
1936).154  The desperate Austrian government, however, felt that Mussolini would always avoid 
having Hitler at the Brenner, and Ambassador Dodd said that the Austrians felt that “Mussolini 
[did] not intend to abandon Austria.”155   
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 Although American diplomatic dispatches indicated that Italy was loyal to Austria, Yvon 
Delbos, French Minister of Foreign Affairs (1936-1938) said that if German troops attacked 
Czechoslovakia, France would fight; but if Austria were attacked, France would abstain.   
Also, at this time Austria and Czechoslovakia were trying to reach an agreement, as their 
fates were tied closely together.  On this agreement, French Foreign Minister Delbos commented 
in May 1937 that Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Austria combined could not stop 
Germany militarily.  Mussolini attempted to stop any agreement between Southeast European 
states, as to not provoke a German attack.  The Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Stefan Osusky 
felt that Hitler would not attack Czechoslovakia until at least the spring of 1938, but admitted 
that, as of the summer 1937, Austria could be attacked at any time.  By this time both Austrian 
Chancellor Schuschnigg and Czechoslovakian President Eduard Benes agreed that only through 
the strong support of Britain, France and Italy could the independence of Southeast Europe be 
preserved.156
Franz von Papen, German Minister to Austria (1934-1938), whose job it was to 
undermine Austria’s diplomatic position in Europe, showed considerable chutzpah when he went 
to Paris to determine whether France would react more to an attack on Czechoslovakia or 
Austria, echoing what the American diplomats reported.  France informed Papen the French 
would fight for Czechoslovakia, fulfilling the limits of their treaty obligations.  Paris also said – 
with less fervor – that they would view unfavorably any change in the international status of 
Austria.157  Germany seemed to be drawing close to a move against Austria, but Czechoslovakia 
seemed to be under no immediate threat (which could explain French willingness to fight for 
Czechoslovakia).  French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos thought that only giving in to 
Germany’s colonial desires would appease them (Austria and the Czech Sudetenland would not 
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count as colonies because of their geographic position, adjacent to Germany, not to mention that 
Germany already considered them quasi-part of the Deutsches Reich).158
 Truculent associates of Hitler continued to indicate future aggressive plans of action.  
Göring revealed that German policy was now to incorporate all Germans into the Deutsches 
Reich because they were now only separated by artificially boundaries created at the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference.  Göring also said that an agreement between Austria, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia would cause Germany to go to war in Southeast Europe, as all Germans must be 
united.  Göring also indicated that Germany only had dreams of regaining what was lost at 
Versailles.159
 In the United States around this time, Roosevelt gave a speech in Chicago on the Sino-
Japanese war that had been escalating for the past few months.  Although hardly noticed in 
Europe, FDR called for a global quarantine of aggressor nations, mostly by economic means.160  
Roosevelt said that when sickness ravaged a group of people, the community joined together in a 
quarantine of the sick so that they may protect the health of those who are well against the spread 
of illness.  This was essentially the first sign of America’s willingness to directly address matters 
abroad, although domestically Roosevelt continued to say that there had been no new 
developments in U.S. foreign policy.161
There was a big backlash in the United States over the “quarantine speech.”  Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull claimed that the speech set the United States back six months in changing 
public opinion about involvement in world affairs.162  In a fireside chat shortly after giving the 
speech in Chicago, Roosevelt said, “Peace must affirmatively be reached for.  It can not just be 
wished for.  It can not just be waited for.”163  Roosevelt’s ideas of U.S. isolationism were slowly 
changing, but official American foreign policy continued to be the same.164
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On November 5, 1937, a few weeks after Roosevelt’s “quarantine speech” there was a 
secret meeting of several high ranking Nazi officers about the future of German speaking people 
in Europe.  The minutes of that meeting, known as the “Hossbach Memorandum”, explained 
Hitler’s concern that Germany’s future was dependent on solving the need for Lebensraum 
(living space), food, and raw materials.  The Führer’s plan to solve these problems was to 
incorporate both Czechoslovakia and Austria into the Deutsches Reich.  Although Hitler did not 
see the Nazis situation as imminent in November 1937, he did speculate that he might be ready 
to move as early as summer 1938.165  Shortly after the meeting Göring outlined for Ambassador 
William Bullitt the upcoming course of action for German foreign policy.  Göring noted that 
both Austrians and Sudeten Germans would soon be annexed.166  
With regards to Austria, at the end of 1937 many questions still existed with regards to 
the future Anschluss.  For example, U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullitt indicated that 
based on conversations with Camille Chautemps, French Prime Minister (1937-1938), he 
believed that Anschluss would lead to Italy turning against Germany.  The British sent a secret 
memorandum to Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State (1937-1943) in which the Viscount 
Halifax, British Foreign Secretary (1938-1940), made the British position explicit that London 
supported the status quo, but that sometimes the status quo changed.167  Likewise, Neville 
Chamberlain’s position on the matter was clear that Chamberlain “adamantly opposed a 
powerful American presence in European Affairs.”168
 The first official shift in U.S. foreign policy and the first step in increased armaments 
came in late December 1937.  However, by the time President Roosevelt had decided to slowly 
shift his views on foreign policy and become more proactive in Europe, it was essentially too late 
to save Austria.169  In a December letter from President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the House 
36 
Appropriations Committee, Edward Taylor (D-CO), FDR explained that he had tried “every 
conceivable” effort to stop the belligerents, but they refused to budge.  Roosevelt acknowledged 
that the world as a whole was rapidly increasing its armaments; to deny this was to deny fact.170  
He asked the Chairman to ask the Committee to consider new proposals for increased monies for 
naval armaments.171 However, many became suspicious of President Roosevelt and the motives 
behind his request for rearmament.  Some interpreted this request as a sign that the United States 
was planning for an offensive attack.  In concurrence with the message Secretary Hull said, “in 
our foreign policy there is not any disposition or intent to engage in warfare.”172  
Approximately two weeks later, in his State of the Union address, Roosevelt indicated 
that the United States had respected its treaties, but other countries had not.  Those who had 
shifted their governments from democracy had also shifted to abandon their international legal 
commitments; in order for the United States to "command respect we must keep ourselves 
adequately strong in self-defense.”  These statements signaled the first public shift in foreign 
policy, as FDR called the United States to begin arming itself in self-defense.173  
In early January 1938 Sumner Welles proposed a meeting on November 11 (Armistice 
Day), upon the suggestion of the President that would have invited the international diplomatic 
community to the White House.  There FDR would make a plea for disarmament and economic 
stability to prevent future wars. Secretary Hull was against this plan, but since Roosevelt favored 
it, Welles was allowed to proceed.174
 Welles first attempted to contact British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden about his two 
phased plan.  Unfortunately Eden was on vacation, and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
received Welles’ plan.  Chamberlain disregarded the plan because it conflicted with his own 
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appeasement plan.  Within one month of this event Eden resigned; within two months Austria 
was annexed.175   
Guido Schmidt, Austrian Foreign Minister (1937-1938) admitted that he regretted Eden’s 
resignation.  Schmidt’s wishful thinking posited that Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policy 
was better than that of Eden, and thought that hope now existed of an Anglo-Italian 
understanding that would bring peace to Central Europe.  The Austrian government, Schmidt 
said, planned to continue the struggle for an independent Austria, and confidence was increasing.  
Encouraged by this, Neville Chamberlain requested that FDR hold back further proposals on 
peace to see what his appeasement could accomplish.176
 Appeasement, in Chamberlain’s vision, meant to “settle differences by negotiation and 
concession.”177  Chamberlain’s appeasement policies have been debated vigorously by 
historians.  They have been called everything from a “shameful and bankrupt policy of surrender 
to the dictator-states,” to a “rational strategy in the light of Britain’s weaknesses in the world by 
the 1930s.”  However, appeasement was this and more, argue British historians Paul Kennedy 
and Talbot Imlay.  They contend that appeasement had many phases and faces.  The earlier 
appeasement policies of 1936-1937 are though to have been the best policy given the state of 
world affairs at that time.  However, as the Second World War drew closer in 1938-1939, it 
became apparent to some, not including Neville Chamberlain, that appeasement was a dead-end 
policy.178
 Among the great powers there was much confusion in early 1938 as to which country 
would be attacked first, Austria or Czechoslovakia; there was even more speculation about how 
and when.  According to Prentiss Gilbert, William Dodd’s successor as U.S. Ambassador to 
Germany, no evidence existed in January 1938 that the Anschluss was imminent.  Germany 
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definitely wanted Austria included in the Deutsches Reich, but seemed to be pursuing a gradual 
Anschluss.  Prevailing opinion was that Italy did not want German troops on the Brenner border, 
and therefore still did not favor Anschluss.179  The United States later received even further 
confirmation that the Italians were pro-Austrian.  During a conversation with Italian Ambassador 
to the United States Fulvio Suvich, Under Secretary Sumner Welles was informed that Germany 
wanted colonies and monetary assistance, but had no ambitions in Central Europe, and especially 
no designs on Austria.  Suvich claimed that he was Austrian by birth and had helped Mussolini 
respect Austria after the murder of Dollfuss in 1934.  Suvich claimed that Austrian independence 
was a cornerstone of Italian foreign policy, an obvious falsehood.180
 Realistically though, Germany had a different plan than what Suvich claimed.  In early 
February, Germany accused Austria of violating the 11 July 1936 agreement, to which Austria 
responded that they had not violated the agreement and drew up a list of all the ways that 
Germany had violated it.181  This prompted the meeting on 12 February at Berchtesgaden 
between Hitler and Schuschnigg.  The February 1938 Berchtesgaden meeting was a turning point 
in Hitler’s path to Anschluss.  After the meeting Time magazine praised Schuschnigg for, 
“yielding much without yielding Austria’s territorial integrity.”182  However, a few nights after 
the meeting, Schuschnigg revealed the truth to John C. Wiley, George Messersmith’s successor 
as U.S. Ambassador to Austria, about his meeting in Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest.  Schuschnigg said 
that 12 February was the most horrible day of his life.  “Hitler openly told him of his desire to 
annex Austria, and declared that he could march into Austria with much greater ease and 
infinitely less danger than he incurred in [the] remilitarization of the Rhineland,” Wiley reported.  
After Berchtesgaden, France said they would have to confer with Britain as to whether or not 
they would recommend Schuschnigg to accept or reject Hitler’s demands.  Soon after the French 
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Foreign Minister told Schuschnigg that only a coalition of Britain, France, and Italy could save 
Austria, reaffirming Austria’s long standing position vying for Western protection.183
 Schuschnigg gave Wiley the details of the meeting of Hitlerite brow-beating at 
Berchtesgaden.  Hitler had brought in three generals to Berchtesgaden to pressure the Austrian 
Chancellor.  Hitler made four demands: amnesty for all Austrian Nazis; the Nazis who lost 
pensions and positions to be reinstated; Seyss-Inquart was to be appointed as Minister of the 
Interior (and in charge of all police forces); and Austria was not allowed to make any moves with 
regard to foreign affairs without first consulting Germany.  Hitler told Schuschnigg that the goal 
was to bring together 80 million Germans to dominate Europe.  With respect to the agreement at 
Berchtesgaden: amnesty was granted to Austrian Nazis and the Nazi pensions were reinstated; 
Nazi positions were not.184
 Even after Berchtesgaden, Schuschnigg did not give up hope, even though at this point 
FDR considered the soon to be Anschluss a fait accompli.185  Schuschnigg told U.S. Ambassador 
to Austria Wiley that he still wanted an independent Austria, but if Germany challenged Austria 
militarily, then Schuschnigg would be forced to resign.  In response, Wiley mistakenly told 
Guido Schmidt that the United States urged Austria against any action which might be assumed 
to threaten Austrian independence.  In what was tantamount to scolding, Moffat chided Wiley, 
“We certainly can’t be thought…to assume any responsibility legal or moral in Europe at the 
moment…”186 The only way to maintain Austrian independence, in Schuschnigg’s opinion, was 
for Britain, France, and Italy to join together and support Austria; without such diplomatic 
support Austria would never be safe.  The Austrian Chancellor never seemed to consider U.S. 
involvement in the securing of Austrian independence, as he seemingly considered it a European 
matter.  Chancellor Schuschnigg admitted that getting Britain, France, and Italy together would 
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be difficult because Britain and France would be forced to recognize Italian conquest of 
Ethiopia.  Schuschnigg was doing everything in his power to buy more time, as he did in July 
1936.187
 The Austrian Chancellor claimed to have confidence in his newly appointed Minister of 
the Interior Arthur Seyss-Inquart (who was forced upon him at Berchtesgaden), and still vowed 
to continue struggling for Austrian independence.  Egon Berger-Waldenegg, Austrian 
Ambassador to Italy, said that Seyss-Inquart was a loyal Austrian and glad to see July 11th 
reaffirmed.188  Meanwhile William Bullitt noted that he was told by an unnamed “intimate 
associate” of Arthur Seyss-Inquart’s that the Austrian Minister of the Interior was 100% Nazi, 
and would soon show his true colors.189
 The new U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, and noted anti-Nazi, George Messersmith sent 
a long and fiery memorandum to Cordell Hull in which he discussed the February 12 meeting at 
Berchtesgaden.  Messersmith said that Hitler had made such stringent demands of Austria as to 
leave them without real independence.  Messersmith expressed his bewilderment about how 
Britain could pursue appeasement with Germany given that Germany had never kept agreements 
with anyone.  Moreover, Hitler had spelled out his plan for Anschluss in his 1925 semi-
autobiographical work Mein Kampf.  Yet British policy was focused more than ever on dead 
agreements, complained Messersmith.  Messersmith wrote that in his opinion, if Austria resisted 
Anschluss, Schuschnigg might end up like Dollfuss.  The Assistant Secretary had no doubt that 
Anschluss was Germany’s goal; however, Hitler’s Wehrmacht (German Army) was not militarily 
ready to go to war.  Austria was all but lost unless France or Britain stood up and spoke out in 
support of Austria.  If Hitler was not to be confronted over Austria, Czechoslovakia was sure to 
follow four-to-five months later.  Messersmith correctly assumed that France would fight for 
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Czechoslovakia in February, but would not come to its defense later.  The Assistant Secretary 
claimed that Anschluss would open the flood gates of European conquest to Germany because 
there was no country in Northern or Southeastern Europe that could stop German advances.190  
Messersmith’s predictions were on the mark. 
 On February 20 Hitler gave a speech in which he both affirmed Austrian independence 
and stated that over ten million Germans lived in states adjoining the borders of Deutschland, a 
clear indicator that the Führer considered those ten million a least a de facto part of the 
Deutsches Reich.191  Shortly after Hitler’s speech France coincidentally recognized that a 
German controlled Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania would be too powerful, and 
that France would be destroyed within a few years.  France contacted Britain in an attempt to 
secure an agreement to aid Austria militarily if there was any change in the status quo.  Britain 
said they would agree only if Italy both joined the agreement, and pulled their support from 
Franco’s rebels in Spain.  Mussolini agreed to talk about both ventures with Britain and France, 
but Britain still did not feel comfortable with the agreement so in the end three powers did not 
reach an agreement to protect the independence of Austria. 
 Shortly before the Anschluss, Yvon Delbos said that because Britain had made it clear 
they would do nothing to stop Austria’s annexation and since France did not have the military 
power to stop Germany single-handedly, that the world had reached the stage where diplomacy 
was dead and only force would prevail.  French Prime Minister Eduard Daladier still claimed 
that France would support Czechoslovakia if they were attacked, but he now considered Austria 
a lost cause.192
 On March 9, Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite, where he 
expected all Austrians to vote for a “free, German, independent, social, Christian Austria 
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dedicated to peace.”  The qualifications for voting were “all Austrian citizens, male and female 
born earlier than 1915,” qualifications that eliminated most Nazis from voting.193
 Hitler went into rage over Schuschnigg’s proposed plebiscite, as it would have surely 
meant defeat for Anschluss.  Seyss-Inquart issued an ultimatum to Schuschnigg, on Hitler’s 
directive, to cancel the plebiscite.  Under threat of a Nazi instigated civil war, Schuschnigg 
cancelled the plebiscite, so long as there would be no Nazi disturbances in Austria.  Berlin 
demanded that Schuschnigg must resign, and name Seyss-Inquart as his successor.194
 On the day Schuschnigg resigned, March 11, 1938, the New York Times wrote that the 
United States planned to do nothing about Anschluss.   J. Pierrepont Moffat, head of the Division 
of European Affairs in the State Department, noted that the United States, “had no intention of 
moving before the British and French, as in a purely European situation we did not wish to take 
the lead.”195  Hull said that Austria was opposed to German policy and that the proposed 
plebiscite would have proven that.  Dispatches from foreign governments had long forecasted the 
Anschluss and American and European unwillingness to prevent it.196  The next day, March 12, 
when the Wehrmacht invaded and occupied Austria, Edgar L. G. Prochnik, Austrian Minister to 
the United States received orders to raise the Nazi swastika flag over the Austrian embassy in 
Washington.  Moffat commented that this event made it clear to “Washingtonians that Austria 
was no more.”197
 After the Anschluss, Schuschnigg said that up to March 14 the American press had been 
in general pro-German.  Only on this date did the media focus shift to Germany going after 
smaller states, blatantly breaching agreements.198  German lies and propaganda also began to run 
wild after the Anschluss.  Göring told Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to Germany (1937-
1939), that German troops would withdraw from Austria as soon as order was restored (order 
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was never lost!), and Austria would have a free election (which did not happen).  Seyss-Inquart 
also told Ambassador Wiley that Austria would remain independent after he formed a 
government of “reasonable and moderate men,” which also never happened.  André Francois-
Poncet, French Ambassador to Germany (1931-1938), assessed that the world had mistakenly 
given-in to Hitler, and that the Führer’s desire for further land grabs had been merely aroused 
further.199
 On March 16, four days after the Anschluss, Assistant Secretary of State, George 
Messersmith let it be known to John C. Wiley, the U.S. Ambassador to Austria (1938), that there 
would be no change in U.S. policy no matter what happened elsewhere.  The next day Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull gave a speech wherein he noted that, “Isolationism is not a means to 
security; it is a fruitful source of insecurity,” echoing FDR’s thoughts that the United States 
could not escape staying out of a European conflagration either through isolationism or 
neutrality.  Hull stressed in the speech the necessity of rearmament.  To be isolationist now 
would cost the United States its most valued possessions of freedom and liberty.200
 On April 6, 1938 the United States closed its embassy in Vienna and told Berlin that 
Germany was now responsible for Austria’s debts in accordance with international law, a charge 
which Hitler dismissed.  The United States and the European powers accepted Anschluss either 
de facto, de jure or both, and only Mexico ever formally denounced the German annexation of 
Austria.201
Conclusion 
The United States quietly pulled out of Austria.  Immediately after the Anschluss, FDR 
had wanted to issue a strong response, but was talked out of it by the State Department.202  That 
the United States’ diplomatic relations with Austria ended without much ado about anything 
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should come as no surprise, after American and Western inaction during Austria’s precipitate 
slide toward Anschluss. Although Britain and France were blatant appeasers of Hitler, there is 
little evidence that President Roosevelt saw the Anschluss as a way to quell the appetite of a 
hungry dictator.203   
The Neutrality legislation in place in the United States severely limited FDR’s ability to 
come to Austria’s rescue.  So either because of, or in spite of neutrality legislation, Franklin 
Roosevelt was so consumed with the domestic agenda that foreign affairs were forced to a 
position of lesser importance.  With the Depression in the United States easing after 1933 as 
pointed out by economist Ben Bernanke, the American economic situation was improving, but at 
a rate much too slow considering how much ground the United States lost between 1929 and 
1933.204  FDR’s New Deal, his answer for the Depression, was the President’s first priority.  In 
his own mind, Roosevelt needed to solve the economic crisis and then worry about foreign 
affairs.  His fights with the Supreme Court were a fight to keep his New Deal online; an agenda 
which FDR thought were the key to bringing the country out of the depression.  
 Roosevelt’s philosophical stance on the guarantee of Austrian independence also played a 
significant role in the United States’ ultimate inaction vis-à-vis Hitler’s Anschluss.  FDR saw the 
guarantee of Austrian independence as a purely European matter, not one in which the United 
States should be involved.  France would not militarily support Austria’s independence without 
the aid of Britain, and Britain did not want to support Austria under any circumstance.  So by 
Franklin Roosevelt’s rationale, the United States had no business in Europe’s affairs, if the 
European powers did not take matters into their own hands. 
The United States had ample evidence to support the defense of Austria against Germany, 
if not for the sake of saving Austria itself, than at least for maintaining the European balance of 
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power and global security.  However, regardless of the evidence for Austria needing support for 
its survival, President Roosevelt did not aid Austrian independence due to his top priority in his 
domestic agenda, namely the fights with Congress and the Supreme Court to see his New Deal 
agenda come to fruition and pull the country out of the persistent economic depression.  Through 
his domestic actions and international inaction, FDR decided that since the domestic situation 
was a mess, it was not prudent to try and solve the world’s problems.  In hindsight, had the 
United States been willing to go to war over the Anschluss, World War II might have never 
occurred, but that is speculation at best. 
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